soc.culture.cuba

Addinall

1/9/2012 6:32:00 AM

On Jan 9, 4:14 pm, Addinall <addin...@addinall.net> wrote:
> On Jan 9, 4:09 pm, Addinall <addin...@addinall.net> wrote:
>
> > On Jan 9, 3:59 pm, Addinall <addin...@addinall.net> wrote:
>
> > > WHEN are we going to ditch this rubbish toy of a machine?
> > > WHEN are we going to cancel the order for 14 of the
> > > early production run bits-O-crap?


"In 2012, Australian Defence will decide to put down money for its
first order of F-35s or to go ahead with a “plan-B” that could include
purchase of 24 more F-18 Super Hornets made by Boeing. The Super
Hornet is also unable to take on high-end threats in the Pacific Rim
region in the coming years."

http://www.f-16.net/news_articl...

...." Part of the presentation showed a computer simulation which
calculated that the F-35 would be consistently defeated by the Russian-
made SU-35 fighter aircraft. The defeat calculated by the scenario
also showed the loss of the F-35's supporting airborne-early warning
and air-to-air refueling aircraft.

The technology in the SU-35 will also see its way into growth upgrades
of other SU-fighter variants used by countries like Indonesia, India,
Malaysia and Vietnam. Chinese variants of these aircraft should also
see similar growth capability in the coming years.

The Russian-made T-50, PAK-FA low-observable fighter now in
development is expected to be much more lethal than the SU-35 in air-
to-air combat against the U.S. made F-35. The SU-35 and T-50 made
appearances this year at the Russian aerospace industry air show known
as MAKS2011. Both aircraft will include sensors and networking which
can minimise the effects of the limited low-observable qualities of
the F-35. They will also have higher performance and carry more air-to-
air weapons than an F-35."

Now, I have no opinion here or there on the Yanks invading Darwin. To
me it is a big "so what". However, if one of the reasons touted for
this is the defence of the Pacific region, one has to ask the
question, "with what?".

In the simulation as mentioned, our brand shiney new Wedgetails would
have a life expectancy of a few minutes. Same for the new tankers.

And I don't thing a super-sized Collins class boat is going to do much
damage to a wing of 24 PAK-50s.

Unless we start lobbing nukes at people, Australia and the USSA has no
chance of remaining the 'strong force' of the Pacific.

Mark Addinall.



>
> Full report @
>
> http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/274217/dod-quick-look......
>
> Mark Addinall.
>
>
>
>
>
> > "Relatively large numbers of F-35s are being procured even though the
> > program is early in its development and testing, which means when
> > problems are discovered, the relatively large number of already-
> > procured planes have to undergo costly retrofits. The large number of
> > retrofits and changes concerned the QLR team:
>
> > …the quantity of major Change Requests (CRs) from June 2010 to
> > November 2011 is a concern. Currently, there are 725 change requests
> > which are in the process at the engineering kickoff stage, 696 change
> > requests at the engineering release stage, 538 change requests
> > awaiting manufacturing bill of materials (MBOM) release, and 148
> > change requests available awaiting implementation. Therefore, of the
> > 725 change requests that have been at the engineering kickoff stage,
> > 577 are still not yet available to implement. These figures are
> > indicative of the large volume of change traffic on this program and
> > low design maturity."
>
> > "The United States also has several international partners who are
> > paying for some development costs and planning on buying F-35s. Those
> > partners are watching the program closely. One of those is Australia.
> > Carlo Kopp of Air Power Australia, a think tank that has been critical
> > of the F-35, told POGO, “The program is clearly beyond repair, as the
> > QLR shows that the problems in the design are deep and systemic.
> > Bandaiding is not going to yield a viable product.”
>
> > But just as significant is report language that calls into question
> > many of the F-35’s capabilities.
>
> > “Performance vis-à-vis so called ‘legacy’ aircraft is seriously
> > questioned,” Wheeler added. “Legacy “ aircraft refer to the planes the
> > F-35 is intended to replace, such as the F-16, F/A-18, A-10 and other
> > planes.
>
> > According to the report, there is a concern about “the lack of certain
> > legacy aircraft CAS [close air support] capabilities on the F-35.”
> > Furthermore:
>
> > The operational testers cited unsatisfactory progress and the
> > likelihood of severe operational impacts for survivability, lethality,
> > air vehicle performance, and employment. These conclusions were driven
> > by certain classified issues, critical performance criteria for the
> > helmet mounted display, air vehicle performance, and air-to-air
> > weapons employment.” "
>
> > From the link provided in the original post.
>
> > This programme is a DEAD PARROT.  Put it in the bin.
>
> > Mark Addinall.
>
> > >http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plck.......
> > > JSF - What's Really Happening
> > > Posted by Bill Sweetman at 12/13/2011 7:00 AM CST
>
> > > When the Joint Strike Fighter team told Guy Norris about the jet's
> > > first run to its Mach 1.6 design speed, a couple of minor facts
> > > slipped their minds. Nobody remembered that the jet had landed (from
> > > either that sortie or another run to Mach 1.6) with "peeling and
> > > bubbling" of coatings on the horizontal tails and damage to engine
> > > thermal panels. Or that the entire test force was subsequently limited
> > > to Mach 1.0.
>
> > > But selective amnesia is not even one of five "major consequence"
> > > problems that have already surfaced with the JSF and are disclosed by
> > > a top-level Pentagon review obtained by Ares. Those issues affect
> > > flight safety, the basic cockpit design, the carrier suitability of
> > > the F-35C and other aspects of the program have been identified, and
> > > no fixes have been demonstrated yet. Three more "major consequence"
> > > problems are "likely" to emerge during tests, including high buffet
> > > loads and airframe fatigue.
>
> > > Update:  POGO has the full report here.http://www.pogo.org/resources/national-security/f-35-jsf-co......
>
> > > Experience from flight testing has eviscerated the argument that the
> > > F-35 program architects used to support high concurrency, with fat
> > > production contracts early in the test program: that modeling and
> > > simulation had advanced to the point where problems would be designed
> > > out of the hardware. In fact, the F-35 is having just as many problems
> > > as earlier programs, which means that there is no reason to expect
> > > that it will not continue to do so.
>
> > > The "quick look review" (QLR) panel was chartered by acting Pentagon
> > > acquisition boss Frank Kendall on Oct. 28, eight days after top U.S.
> > > Air Force, Navy and U.K. Royal Air Force operational test force
> > > commanders jointly expressed their concern that the F-35 would not be
> > > ready to start initial operational testing in 2015, as envisaged in
> > > the delayed test program adopted in January.
>
> > > Kendall was looking for an assessment of test progress, as well as a
> > > look at "concurrency risk" - the concern that problems discovered in
> > > testing will result in expensive  modifications to aircraft that are
> > > produced before the fixes can be designed, tested and implemented in
> > > production.
>
> > > The QLR was submitted on Nov. 29, before Navy Vice Adm. Dave Venlet,
> > > the JSF program director, disclosed some of the fatigue issues in
> > > interviews with AOLDefense. Its existence and some of its findings
> > > were reported by Bloomberg's Tony Capaccio early last week.
>
> > > The most positive thing that the QLR has to say about the program is
> > > that the team "identified no fundamental design risks sufficient to
> > > preclude further production." That is, they don't say that the program
> > > should be terminated, or that production should be halted until
> > > problems are fixed. But the team concludes:
>
> > > "The combined impact of these issues results in a lack of confidence
> > > in the design stability...this lack of confidence, in conjunction with
> > > the concurrency driven consequences of the required fixes, supports
> > > serious reconsideration of procurement and production planning...The
> > > QLR team recommends that further decisions about F-35 concurrent
> > > production be event-driven."
>
> > > Since flight testing started to pick up speed in June 2010, 725
> > > engineering change requests have been initiated, of which 148 are
> > > ready to incorporate. On average, it takes 18-24 months between the
> > > identification of a change and its implementation in production. JSF
> > > production orders started three to four years earlier than other
> > > fighters, and even under the current plan, close to 200 aircraft will
> > > be on order by the halfway point in flight testing.
>
> > > Many of the issues described by the QLR have been reported, but not in
> > > detail. Others have been played down by the program. The following are
> > > four of the "big five" issues that have already surfaced. (The fifth
> > > is classified, but dollars to doughnuts it has something to do with
> > > stealth.)
>
> > > We knew that the helmet-mounted display was in trouble. A simpler
> > > alternate HMD was ordered from BAE Systems in September, but it does
> > > not meet the requirement for "through the airplane" zero-light
> > > visibility provided by the electro-optical distributed aperture
> > > system. (Yes, that EO-DAS, that makes maneuvering irrelevant.)
>
> > > Today, the killer problem with EO-DAS is latency: the image in the
> > > helmet lags 130 milliseconds behind sightline movement where the spec
> > > is under 40 ms. (So the video is where the pilot's head was pointed an
> > > eighth of a second ago.) That can't be fixed without changing the
> > > JSF's integrated core processor - the jet's central brain - and the EO-
> > > DAS sensors. Even the backup helmet faces buffet and latency issues,
> > > simply for symbology.
>
> > > The underwing fuel dump system on the JSF doesn't get fuel clear of
> > > the aircraft surfaces, so that fuel accumulates in the flaperon and
> > > may get into the integrated power package (IPP) exhaust. That creates
> > > a fire hazard, particularly on a ship deck after landing. Fuel dumping
> > > has been banned except in an emergency. Two unsuccessful modifications
> > > have been tried on the F-35B.
>
> > > The IPP - the cause of a grounding this summer, after a "catastrophic
> > > failure" caused IPP parts to puncture a fuel tank - is turning out to
> > > be unreliable. It's supposed to last 2,200 hours, but so far in the
> > > flight test program, 16 IPPs have been removed and replaced - a
> > > process that takes two days of 24-hour work.
>
> > > The arrester hook issue has been reported. In the first round of
> > > tests, the hook failed to catch the wire once. The QLR notes that
> > > tests of a minimal modification - a reprofiled hook with different
> > > damper settings - set for April "represent only the initial stages
> > > leading into full carrier suitability demonstrations."
>
> > > Studies are already underway of changing the hook's location - the
> > > basic problem is that the designers put the hook closer behind the
> > > main landing gear than that of any current or recent Navy aircraft,
> > > even the tailless X-47B - but that will have "major, direct primary
> > > and secondary structural impacts".
>
> > > The QLR report predicts more problems, based on experience so far,
> > > historical data, and the collapse of the "test is validation"
> > > orthodoxy.
>
> > > F-35 flight tests have not gone beyond 20 degrees angle of attack, and
> > > higher-than-predicted buffet loads have been experienced. So far,
> > > severity has been similar to current aircraft but it is experienced
> > > over a large part of the envelope. Exploration of the
>
> ...
>
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